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The need for transformation of the judiciary in South Africa has been the subject of much public
discussion and debate, both in the media and among legal professionals. This article argues that the key
test of judicial transformation is not whether it meets some abstract standard established by students of
the law, but whether judges and courts enjoy widespread legitimacy in society. It will suggest that this
approach can explain why we need a more racially and gender representative judiciary if our justice
system is to operate effectively – but will also argue that a concern for racial and gender change alone will
not secure the public trust in the courts and the judiciary that transformation should seek to achieve.  A
broader reform agenda, which understands the intrinsic link between an improved judicial system and
winning broad public support for a more representative judiciary, is thus needed. 
The state of the judiciary – and its transformation
– is entirely in the eye of the beholder. 
At first glance, this seems like one of those
platitudes we trot out when we are not sure that
we understand where events are headed. But in
reality, it expresses a key insight about the
judiciary often missed in the debate on its future.
While calls for transformation and for reform of
the justice system are not new – and the
government has proposed changes far wider than
demographic redress –  the link between them is
often ignored or, indeed, denied. The position
adopted in this article is that racial and gender
transformation will not succeed without wider
reforms – and that these reforms will not
produce a legitimate and effective justice system
unless the demographics of the judiciary
continue to change.
THE PROBLEM WITH LAWYERS'
SELF-IMAGE
Why insist that public perception is key to judicial
reform?
Many lawyers and judges and much public
commentary assume that the difference between
legal skill and the lack thereof is clear. From this
point of view, legal training and practice impart
understanding and knowledge: only those who
have it can interpret the law accurately and fairly.
Those who practice law are, therefore,  particularly
clear examples of an 'epistemic community' – a
'network of knowledge-based experts … with an
authoritative claim to … knowledge within the
domain of their expertise'.1 Like other such
communities, they claim to know more about a
particular field of knowledge than the rest of us.
Since this knowledge is useful to society, they
claim also that our interests are best served if those
who have this expertise are allowed to apply it
unhindered. 
* Prof Steven Friedman is Director, Centre for the Study 
of Democracy, Rhodes University/University of
Johannesburg.
According to this view, we are most likely to have
the justice system we need if the judiciary is left
alone to apply its knowledge unhindered by
politicians or the citizenry.
But, like other epistemic communities, lawyers' and
judges' claim that there is a 'right' and a 'wrong'
way to apply knowledge – in this case, to  interpret
the law – and that the difference is clear, often
turns out to be far shakier than it might seem.
Lawyers and judges are human and, like the rest of
us, they have values and beliefs. Inevitably, these
influence judgments not because the judge is
biased but because many of the issues on which
judges must pronounce are, in reality, moral
choices disguised as judicial questions. 
This is most obvious where, as in South Africa, the
constitution is supreme and judges must interpret
it. How does legal training establish whether the
right to life means that we should execute
murderers? How does it tell us what is hate speech
and what is free speech? Or, to cite issues that have
been decided by our courts, how does legal
training decide whether an ill man should enjoy
dialysis at public expense2 or how much free water
the poor should receive?3 In all these cases, the
ruling will depend on the judge's values and
political orientation, not on an 'objective'
interpretation of the law. 
This is why constitutional courts in  centuries-old
democracies such as the United States are constant
sites of political contest4 and why democracies
always ensure some sort of political process to
choose constitutional judges. In much of
constitutional law, political judgment is more at
issue than legal training. And so the issue is not
whether the best 'experts' have been appointed to
the bench but whether members of that society –
or, more accurately, those who enjoy access to the
national debate – find the process by which these
issues are decided to be fair.
But constitutional issues are, of course, not the only
ones that require the judgment of the courts. Those
who insist that legal knowledge is paramount
would no doubt argue that competence matters a
great deal more in weighing evidence in criminal
trials or, perhaps more particularly, in sifting
through the complexities of a complicated civil
action between large corporations. Obviously, legal
training is important here. But even here the
difference between a 'good' and 'bad' judgement is
subjective. By their very nature, court actions are
disputed: the accused is either convicted or
acquitted, in civil actions one side wins and the
other loses. And inevitably, what can seem a
brilliant judgment to the victors may appear to the
losers as a sign of judicial incompetence. 
No 'objective' standard can tell us which side was
right and the question of who is a 'good' judge will
thus always be a matter of opinion. Thus a
prominent legal scholar accepts that 'legal brilliance'
may not be the chief qualification of the 'good'
judge and that qualities such as an even
temperament, a sense of fairness and a commitment
to independence may be more important qualities
than a view within the 'epistemic community' that
she or he possesses outstanding legal ability.5
This observation can be extended beyond the
individual judge to the institution: the test of a
'good' judiciary, one which serves its society's needs
well, is that it should be seen by most of society as
even-tempered, independent and fair. This is far
more important than whether it is seen by the legal
community to be technically expert. To put the
same point another way, we ought to judge our
judiciary and our justice system by its legitimacy
among the citizenry, not by the peer review of the
legal profession. 
This is not simply a normative point. It might well
be a question on which the survival of an
independent judiciary depends. 
A reality rarely recognised in South African debate
is that threats  to the independence of the judiciary
are inevitable in new democracies and are not
unheard of in much older ones. There is nothing
normal or natural about the idea that judges can tell
elected politicians that the laws they pass or the
decisions they take are invalid. And so, wherever
courts do enjoy this power, political office-holders
are likely to see it as irksome and to seek to
challenge it or to dispense with it. Given this, the
tests of judicial independence South Africa has
recently experienced – such as complaints by
4 Institute for Security Studies
 
political leaders that judges are biased against
senior politicians6 – are not crises; they are simply
evidence that South Africa experiences the same
pressures as other democracies. The key is not
whether judicial independence is challenged but
whether it survives the challenge intact. This will
depend on political support in society for the
judiciary's independence: if key interest groups do
not see the judiciary as a valuable guarantor of
their rights, they will not defend judges'
independence if it is threatened. Legitimacy is thus
key to the survival of an independent judiciary.
On this criteria, how does our judiciary fare?
THREATS TO THE JUDICIARY'S
CREDIBILITY  
South Africa's judiciary enjoys assets that are often
taken for granted here but are not available in
many other societies.
Firstly, citizens do not believe that judges are
corrupt: survey evidence reveals that the majority
of citizens still trust the courts, despite the
controversies which have beset them over the past
two years.7 While many South Africans might take
this for granted, there is nothing automatic about
the perception that, whatever may be wrong with
our justice system, our judicial officers are not
bought. Corruption among judicial officers is a
problem not only in countries of the global South
but also in developed northern countries like the
United States of America.8
Secondly, and possibly flowing from the first,
respect for judicial decisions is high in South
Africa. Court orders are respected, at least in
public, by those whom they negatively affect –
even when they are politicians engaged in
conflicts. Thus the Inkatha Freedom Party
accepted the Constitutional Court's 1996 decision
to certify the constitution even though it had
objected to it on grounds that prompted a political
battle which nearly derailed the constitutional
settlement.9 Since South Africa became a
democracy, the government has not defied any
judicial orders, even though it may have dragged
its feet in implementing them. (The celebrated
Grootboom housing judgment would be a case in
point, as would cases of provincial non-
compliance, which stem more from capacity
constraints than a reluctance to comply.) But this
happens even in societies where respect for the law
is assumed. Even where citizens might be moved to
criticise a court ruling, they do not contest its
legitimacy.
These two assets are, as noted above, more
important than those who take our democracy for
granted seem to assume. They suggest that, despite
the society's deep divisions, the judiciary does not
yet face a legitimacy crisis. But there are significant
warning signals that the legitimacy the judiciary
and the justice system need is in danger.
Firstly, there is said to be a significant trend among
more affluent citizens and companies to use private
arbitration rather than the courts.10 While this is in
line with international trends, it could be a
response either to a perception that the judiciary is
no longer to be trusted under majority rule, or to
the severe overload of the justice system, or both.
Some analysts have argued that private arbitration
is functional to the system because it relieves
pressure on already overburdened courts and
judges.11 But, whatever its concrete effects, its use
does suggest that a key section of society, with
considerable access to capital and skills, seeks to
bypass rather than use the system, a trend with
clear negative implications for its legitimacy as a
means of resolving conflict.
Secondly, elsewhere among the business and
professional elite, participants in a Black
Management Forum symposium on the
constitution held in April 2010 complained that the
courts repeatedly found against black individuals
or black-owned businesses seeking to use legal
action to speed up black economic empowerment.
They argued that this was a symptom of an
'untransformed' judiciary and that the solution was
to ensure that far more black judges were
appointed.12 This highlights in a direct way the link
between transformation – understood as enhanced
racial representativeness – and legitimacy. Among
some sections of the emerging black professional
and business elite, then, court decisions on key
issues will not be legitimate as long as whites
continue to hold a disproportionate share of
judicial posts.
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Thirdly, grassroots citizens clearly have their
doubts about the legitimacy of the judicial process.
The issue here is not social and economic rights,
but crime. In these cases residents respond to
murders, rapes or other crimes against the person
by insisting that the judicial process is inadequate
to deal with the problem. Attempts by grassroots
citizens to rely on vigilantism rather than the
courts may not directly express dissatisfaction with
judges; it may reflect frustration with poor
policing. But more than a few are prompted by the
belief that criminals are not convicted by the
courts, either because they are able to afford
lawyers who win their acquittal, or because
witnesses will not testify.13 The issue here is not a
perception that individual judges are incapable of
dispensing justice, but that the system cannot do
this. This has implications to which we will return.
But it does indicate that the problem of judicial
legitimacy may be more deep-rooted than an
exclusive focus on the bench's demographics might
suggest.
UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM –
AND ITS SOLUTIONS 
These trends do not necessarily mean that the
judiciary's legitimacy is in terminal decline or that
the justice system's integrity is in mortal peril. But
they do suggest that the apparent consensus on
respect for the judiciary is fraying at the edges.
They also indicate the multiple pressures that face
any attempt to win broad legitimacy for the
judiciary and the justice system. What does this
say about the way forward?
Firstly, the concerns of black business and
professionals confirm that the racial composition
of the judiciary is a core test of legitimacy in key
constituencies. The argument that black judges will
inevitably empathise with majority aspirations is
simplistic – much like the expectation that women
public representatives will be certain to champion
women's concerns. But activist black lawyers and
business people are not the only citizens whose
support for the justice system would be enhanced
if the judiciary more accurately expressed the
society's demographics. In a society in which race
has long been the key fault line, the race of judges
is likely to enhance judicial legitimacy among the
majority even if it is not decisive. Much the same
point might be made about enhancing the
representation of women on the bench: it will not
automatically ensure that the judiciary enjoys more
legitimacy among women, but is likely to help. 
Lack of progress on gender is clear: only 49 of 216
judges are women14 and pressure is building here
for swifter change. On race, the picture is more
complex. Most judges are now black but whites
remain over-represented: by mid-2009, 44% of
judges were white.15 It is difficult to evaluate this.
While it is the policy of the ruling party to assess
progress against the country's demographics, there
is no evidence that strict racial proportionality is
needed to ensure legitimacy. But, while it would be
misleading to suggest that full legitimacy can only
be achieved if the bench directly reflects society's
demographics, it is equally clear that the bench
does need to be predominantly black if the judicial
system is to enjoy the required legitimacy among
black elites who are, of course, likely to remain an
important social constituency.
Obviously the society's racial divisions mean that
these gains in black legitimacy may be won at the
expense of further decline among whites, in
particular professionals and business people. This
may create the impression that the circle cannot be
squared because what is legitimate to elites among
the racial majority is certain to erode it among the
minority. But racial attitudes are not immutable
and in South Africa there is much evidence that
minority views do change – during the period
when apartheid was unravelling, it was not
uncommon to find swift shifts in racial attitudes
once changes, which were feared before they were
introduced, turned out not to be threatening.
White support for the Immorality Act, which
banned inter-racial sex, dropped from 61% a year
before it was repealed in 1985, to 38% after repeal
became a fait accompli.16 In the post-apartheid
period, the appointment of a black Minister of
Finance prompted a sharp drop in the value of the
Rand. Some years later the same minister, Trevor
Manuel, was seen as a guarantor of white business
confidence.
This suggests that a decline in the judiciary's
legitimacy among whites is not an inevitable
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consequence of a more representative judiciary –
attitudes will depend on how this change is
experienced by white professionals and people in
business. And this implies that  the challenge is
not whether to change the composition of the
bench, but how to do it. 
An approach that rests solely on ensuring that
racial quotas are met is likely to entail a significant
loss in legitimacy among whites. By contrast, a
strategy that recognises the need to ensure that
change occurs in a way that makes a transformed
judiciary more appealing to this constituency may
be most likely to achieve legitimacy among black
and white elites. And that requires, at the very
least, processes of judicial selection which are seen
to be fair – a requirement which seems often to
have been forgotten in the recent round of Judicial
Services Commission hearings. In a sense, JSC
interviews of judges achieved the worst of both
worlds – racial and gender change was fairly
limited but the rhetoric of Commission members
created the impression that white men were no
longer tolerated on the bench.17 Precisely the
opposite is required – a process that is seen to give
each candidate a fair hearing but also produces
significant racial and gender change. Clearly also,
the more the JSC is seen to defend the interests of
power-holders and sitting judges rather than
citizens (a conclusion some have drawn from its
refusal to hear the complaint against the Judge
President of the Western Cape that alleged he had
tried to influence fellow judges to find in favour of
the State President),18 the less legitimate – and the
less transformed – will the judiciary seem to be.     
Enhanced legitimacy for racial change may also
depend on a form of transformation that would
assist grassroots citizens and that is not often seen
as a key feature of the transformation debate – a
swifter, more citizen-friendly justice system.
Besides serving citizens better, this would signal
to doubters that a demographically representative
judicial system can be effective too. 
A further reform task must be an attempt to
ensure a judicial system more accessible to those
who currently lack the resources to access it. A
judicial system that is as transparent as possible is
also a transformation priority – a judge who, for
example, rules on a racially sensitive dispute
without giving any reasons for the ruling is
certain to diminish the system's legitimacy.19
When the judge happens to be white and the
person against whom the ruling is made is black,
the legitimacy of the justice system may well be
impaired by the perception that courts are being
used to buttress minority values and interests as
they were under apartheid. Judicial independence
does not mean that judicial officers are
unaccountable: explaining judgments to society as
well as to the parties to an action is an elementary
form of accountability, which should be
mandatory for any judge. This issue is a challenge
for the judiciary. The more it impresses on its
members that their independence is not unlimited
because it must be constrained by the need, at the
very least, to explain why judges reach their
rulings,20 the more likely it is that the essence of
judicial independence, the need to ensure that
judges rule on the strength of their conscience,
will be preserved. 
A more efficient, accessible and transparent
system – one in which access to justice is not
delayed for long periods and is affordable to all,
and in which judges see a need to account
speedily and fully for their decisions – may not
automatically allay grassroots suspicions that our
judicial system allows criminals to escape
sanction. Improved policing may do more to
enhance confidence than a reformed judicial
system, because citizens' perceptions that the
guilty are often not punished may be a function of
inadequate policing rather than weaknesses in the
courts. But it is surely trite to point out that a
system that does not convince citizens that it is
accessible, fair and independent of private and
public power-holders, will not retain widespread
legitimacy, whatever the bench's demographic
composition.
CONCLUSION
In summary, further progress towards a more
demographically representative judiciary is
essential to convince most citizens that the
judicial system is fair and independent. But, while
this is a necessary condition for legitimacy, it is
not sufficient, for two reasons.
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Firstly, a concern only with racial and gender
representivity is likely to ensure the continued
erosion of the system's legitimacy in the eyes of
whites, and perhaps of other racial minorities too.
Evidence suggests that a demographically
representative bench can win the trust of sceptics
in the racial minorities, but only if progress is
made in making the judicial system more
accessible to most people, ensuring that
proceedings are swifter, and encouraging the
independence of judges and courts.
Secondly, while greater racial and gender
representivity might satisfy some lobby groups, it
will not on its own address the wider threat to
legitimacy posed by grassroots citizens' doubts
that the system protects them. Reforms such as
those proposed here are needed if the judiciary is
to retain public trust.
On both grounds, a broader transformation
agenda than that which currently seems to be
occupying the minds of key participants in the
debate on judicial change is essential. To be sure,
proposals for reform that address far more than
demographics have been placed on the table, by
government as well as other parties. But these
broader questions of judicial transformation have
tended to be lost of late in the polarised racial
debate. They need to be revived, not only because
change is badly needed, but because racial and
gender change will be far easier in the context of a
wider reform agenda.
South Africa's divisions mean that further
demographic change is needed if the judiciary is
to win sustained legitimacy. But despite these
divisions and the pressures on the courts created
by a high crime rate, it is possible to win broad
public legitimacy for a more demographically
representative judiciary – but only if demographic
change is seen as a necessary component of a
much broader reform agenda.
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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